Opinion by Hon. Malek Cook-Dwach
The Tumaini Peace Initiative (TPI), launched on May 9, 2024, by Kenyan President H.E. William Ruto in Nairobi, was intended to mediate the ongoing peace process in South Sudan. It was initiated at the request of South Sudanese President H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, who sought to take over the mediation efforts previously handled by the Sant’Egidio Community in Rome, Italy.
Kiir expressed frustration with the prolonged talks, particularly with the holdout groups, and the lack of substantial progress toward a resolution.
The primary goal of the TPI was to incorporate the holdout groups that had not signed the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).
From the outset, the initiative was met with a hopeful reception from South Sudanese of all backgrounds, who viewed it as a potential path toward genuine reconciliation and lasting peace among the country’s political leaders.
Emerging Suspicion and Disagreements
However, suspicions began to surface as the process progressed. A series of demands from the South Sudanese Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) revealed deep dissatisfaction with the R-ARCSS, which they felt did not adequately address their specific concerns.
These opposition groups argued that the circumstances they faced warranted separate agreements that would more directly address issues such as power-sharing, resource allocation, and security arrangements.
In contrast, the South Sudanese government, which has remained firm in its stance on the R-ARCSS, believes that any new peace initiative should be integrated into the existing framework as an annex rather than treated as a separate agreement.
This position is based on the government’s desire to maintain sovereignty and ensure that all peace processes align with the national interest and the foundational principles of the R-ARCSS.
The Stalemate and Growing Tensions
The fundamental disagreement between the opposition groups and the government regarding the structure of the peace process has created a significant bottleneck.
The two sides have been unwilling to compromise on their respective positions, with the government insisting that any new agreements must be subsumed under the R-ARCSS, while the opposition demands a separate track to address their specific needs.
This impasse has led to stalled negotiations, diminishing trust between the parties and raising serious concerns about the viability of the Tumaini Peace Initiative.
The failure to reach a consensus on whether the TPI should be an annex to the existing peace agreement or remain an independent initiative has cast doubt on its long-term effectiveness as a peacebuilding mechanism. As the situation remains gridlocked, many stakeholders are beginning to question whether the TPI can achieve its intended goals of peace and reconciliation.
Conclusion: A Fragile Peace Process
The growing deadlock between the government and opposition forces has significantly undermined the Tumaini Peace Initiative’s potential for success.
The lack of agreement on its structure, combined with the failure to address the critical concerns of the opposition, has led to widespread skepticism about the initiative’s future. Without a significant shift in the positions of the key stakeholders, the likelihood of the TPI collapsing becomes increasingly probable.
Ultimately, the initiative’s fate hinges on the ability of the parties to move beyond their entrenched positions and find common ground. As it stands, the Tumaini Peace Initiative is at a crossroads, and its survival depends on the willingness of both the government and opposition to engage in meaningful compromise for the sake of peace and stability in South Sudan.
(Author of the Opinion) Hon. Malek Cook-Dwach is a Member of Parliament representing the Leer Constituency in the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA). The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the position of the institution he represents.
